Paper titles are redacted for papers that are under review.
Facts, Perceptions, and Misperceptions
Public Misperceptions of European Integration: A Comparative Study of Six EU Member States. With Ben Lyons, Vittorio Merola, and Jason Reifler.
Public Misperceptions of the EU: Evidence from the UK. With Ben Lyons, Vittorio Merola, and Jason Reifler.
Public Opinion on Fact Checking. With Ben Lyons, Vittorio Merola, and Jason Reifler. (Accepted For Publication)
Conspiracy Theories
Conspiracy thinking and foreign policy views: Evidence from Slovakia. With Michal Onderco. (under review, R&R)
Paper abstract. How does conspiracy thinking influence foreign policy views among the population? We study this question using unique survey data from Slovakia. Our results show that individuals who believe in conspiracy theories are less likely to support pro-Western orientation of the country, and instead see its foreign policy in neutral terms.
Public Support for Conspiratorial Thinking in Europe. With Joelle Tasker.
Paper abstract. How widespread is conspiratorial thinking in Europe? Who supports conspiracy theories in Europe? Which individual level characteristics help us understand why citizens believe in conspiracies? This paper sheds light on these questions and presents results of a novel population based survey that was fielded in a diverse set of ten EU member states in 2017. The data includes probability samples for each country, allowing us to make inferences from the set of 1100 respondents per country to the population at large. Our dependent variable is a measure that gauges the extent to which citizens believe in political conspiracies more generally, rather than the extent to which they believe a country specific conspiracy theory (McClosky and Chong 1985).
Based on a rich literature that examines conspiratorial thinking in the US (e.g. Uscinski and Parent, 2014; Oliver and Wood 2014, Goertzel, 1994), we expect three factors in particular to help us understand who exhibits conspiratorial thinking in Europe. This includes the (1) level of control that individuals perceive to have over their lives, (2) predispositions, and (3) situational triggers.
Experiencing little control over one’s life can be a result of limited material resources, e.g. having a lower income or being involuntarily unemployed. Education, on the other hand, is a cognitive resource which can make it easier for individuals not to feel lost or powerless in a complex political world. The literature also highlights the important role of predispositions for conspiratorial thinking (e.g. Goertzel, 1994; Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, and Gregory, 1999). We focus on two particular predispositions: interpersonal trust and ideological orientations. An argument from the US context is also that conspiratorial thinking is not only a result of characteristics of an individual but that it is also driven by contextual factors or what we call situational triggers. For instance, it makes a difference for voters whether the party they support is in government (Uscinski and Parent, 2014). On the other hand, media consumption – and where citizens get their information from – can be related to the extent to which respondents believe conspiracy theories.
Our data shows that conspiratorial thinking is widespread in Europe. We also find that the three sets of explanations – a sense of control, predispositions, and situational triggers – help us to understand the differences between citizens who show conspiratorial thinking and those who do not show conspiratorial thinking.
Based on a rich literature that examines conspiratorial thinking in the US (e.g. Uscinski and Parent, 2014; Oliver and Wood 2014, Goertzel, 1994), we expect three factors in particular to help us understand who exhibits conspiratorial thinking in Europe. This includes the (1) level of control that individuals perceive to have over their lives, (2) predispositions, and (3) situational triggers.
Experiencing little control over one’s life can be a result of limited material resources, e.g. having a lower income or being involuntarily unemployed. Education, on the other hand, is a cognitive resource which can make it easier for individuals not to feel lost or powerless in a complex political world. The literature also highlights the important role of predispositions for conspiratorial thinking (e.g. Goertzel, 1994; Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, and Gregory, 1999). We focus on two particular predispositions: interpersonal trust and ideological orientations. An argument from the US context is also that conspiratorial thinking is not only a result of characteristics of an individual but that it is also driven by contextual factors or what we call situational triggers. For instance, it makes a difference for voters whether the party they support is in government (Uscinski and Parent, 2014). On the other hand, media consumption – and where citizens get their information from – can be related to the extent to which respondents believe conspiracy theories.
Our data shows that conspiratorial thinking is widespread in Europe. We also find that the three sets of explanations – a sense of control, predispositions, and situational triggers – help us to understand the differences between citizens who show conspiratorial thinking and those who do not show conspiratorial thinking.
Identities and Immigration
Economic Insecurity and Attitudes Towards Immigrants: Evidence from a Panel Survey. With Hanna Kleider.
Brexit Identity Prejudice: Evidence from Six Experiments. With Max Talman.
Democracy and Tolerance
Do Citizens Tolerate Those They Disagree With? Political and Social Tolerance in Europe. With Besir Ceka.
Paper Abstract. Tolerance has long been identified as crucial feature of liberal democracies. The extent to which citizens of a country are open to and willing to accommodate others who are different than them is a sign of a healthy and well-functioning liberal democracy. Contemporary western societies, however, show distressing signs of intolerance. The rise of populist far right parties, the resurgence of nationalism and nativism, and increasing levels religious prejudice suggest that intolerance might be on the rise. The main goal of this paper is to empirically investigate the causes of political and social intolerance in Europe. The main questions we ask are: What explains the different levels of tolerance in various countries? Which groups in society are the most likely targets of intolerance and why? We understand political intolerance as the readiness to curtail the democratic rights of others on the basis of their views (e.g. denial of parliamentary representation). By contrast, social intolerance refers to the willingness to discriminate against disliked groups of people in social settings on the basis of their cultural and lifestyle differences or political views (e.g. opposing teachers from disliked groups in schools and as romantic dating partner in the family). The analysis employs original survey data collected as part of the EUENGAGE mass survey conducted in 2017 in ten European Union member states: Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom. The goal is to understand the cross-national patterns and the individual-level determinants of intolerance.
Gender Equality
- Who is a Feminist? Understanding Public Opinion on Gender Equality and Feminism in Europe.
